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Flexible behavior requires a control system that can inhibit actions
in response to changes in the environment. Recent studies suggest
that people proactively adjust response parameters in anticipation
of a stop signal. In three experiments, we tested the hypothesis
that proactive inhibitory control involves adjusting both atten-
tional and response settings, and we explored the relationship with
other forms of proactive and anticipatory control. Subjects
responded to the color of a stimulus. On some trials, an extra signal
occurred. The response to this signal depended on the task context
subjects were in: in the ‘ignore’ context, they ignored it; in the
‘stop’ context, they had to withhold their response; and in the
‘double-response’ context, they had to execute a secondary
response. An analysis of event-related brain potentials for no-
signal trials in the stop context revealed that proactive inhibitory
control works by biasing the settings of lower-level systems that
are involved in stimulus detection, action selection, and action exe-
cution. Furthermore, subjects made similar adjustments in the
double-response and stop-signal contexts, indicating an overlap
between various forms of proactive action control. The results of
Experiment 1 also suggest an overlap between proactive inhibitory
control and preparatory control in task-switching studies: both
require reconfiguration of task-set parameters to bias or alterork was
mework
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28 H. Elchlepp et al. / Cognitive Psychology 86 (2016) 27–61subordinate processes. We conclude that much of the top-down
control in response inhibition tasks takes place before the inhibi-
tion signal is presented.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
At the core of flexible and goal-directed behavior is the ability to replace or withhold planned
actions in response to changes in the environment or internal states. Response inhibition receives
much attention across research domains, including cognitive, social, developmental, and clinical psy-
chology, cognitive neuroscience, psychopharmacology, and psychiatry (see e.g. Aron, 2011; Bari &
Robbins, 2013; Verbruggen, Chambers, & Logan, 2013; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). For example, defi-
ciencies in response inhibition have been associated with psychological disorders such as attention
deficit/hyperactivity disorder, obsessive–compulsive disorder, substance abuse, pathological gam-
bling, and overeating (Bechara, Noël, & Crone, 2006; Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Crews
& Boettiger, 2009; de Wit, 2009; Garavan & Stout, 2005; Nigg, 2001; Noël, Brevers, & Bechara,
2013). The study of response inhibition has therefore been a major component in the endeavor to bet-
ter understand and combat impulsive and compulsive behavior. However, early studies failed to
explain how responses are stopped when a stop signal is presented (‘reactive inhibitory control’)
and they did not acknowledge that successful response inhibition largely depends on advance task
preparation (‘proactive inhibitory control’). In recent years, several studies have proposed detailed
accounts of the cognitive processes underlying reactive inhibitory control. Here we present a detailed
cognitive account of proactive inhibitory control in the stop-signal paradigm.
The stop-signal paradigm is currently one of the most popular paradigms to study response inhi-
bition in the laboratory because it allows researchers to estimate the covert latency of response inhi-
bition: the stop-signal reaction time (SSRT). SSRT has become an established and important marker for
reactive inhibitory control on stop-signal trials (Verbruggen et al., 2013). Many researchers use SSRT
as a pure measure of reactive inhibitory control, and they attribute (implicitly or explicitly) differences
between groups, individuals, and conditions to variation in the effectiveness of suppressing motor out-
put. However, reactive inhibitory control on stop-signal trials involves a chain of processes that results
in a response being withheld (e.g., Boucher, Palmeri, Logan, & Schall, 2007; Logan, Van Zandt,
Verbruggen, & Wagenmakers, 2014; Logan, Yamaguchi, Schall, & Palmeri, 2015; Salinas & Stanford,
2013; van de Laar, van den Wildenberg, van Boxtel, & van der Molen, 2010; Verbruggen & Logan,
2015; Verbruggen, McLaren, & Chambers, 2014; Verbruggen, Stevens, & Chambers, 2014). More specif-
ically, stopping requires perceptual, decisional (action selection), and motor-related processes to be
successful. Consequently, SSRT reflects more than the duration of a single neural motor-related inhi-
bitory process (Verbruggen & Logan, 2015).
Researchers have also used the stop-signal paradigm to study how people adjust their behavior
when they are informed that they may have to stop a response in the near future (proactive inhibitory
control). Unfortunately, most of the work on proactive inhibitory control is descriptive and relies on
general constructs. For example, researchers often equate proactive inhibitory control with ‘response
slowing’. Other studies have focused primarily on anticipatory regulation of response activation or
motor excitability (for reviews, see Aron, 2011; Stuphorn & Emeric, 2012). Most likely, this
response- or motor-related focus stems from the focus on response-related processes in the reactive
inhibitory control literature. For example, Verbruggen and Logan (2009a) fitted sequential sampling
models to stop-signal data and found that subjects increased the response thresholds when they antic-
ipated a stop signal, resulting in longer go reaction times and higher go accuracy (Verbruggen & Logan,
2009a; see also Logan et al., 2014). Other studies suggest that motor output is proactively modulated
when stop signals can occur (e.g., Cai, Oldenkamp, & Aron, 2011; Lavallee, Meemken, Herrmann, &
H. Elchlepp et al. / Cognitive Psychology 86 (2016) 27–61 29Huster, 2014; Lo, Boucher, Paré, Schall, & Wang, 2009; Wiecki & Frank, 2013; Wong-Lin, Eckhoff,
Holmes, & Cohen, 2010).
The present study has three specific aims. First, we aim to provide clear evidence for the idea that
proactive inhibitory control involves adjusting both attentional and response parameters. Second, we
will test the idea that similar control adjustments are made in situations in which no response inhi-
bition is required. Third, we will test the idea that proactive inhibitory control is similar to the
dynamic reconfiguration of task-set parameters in situations in which people have to switch tasks
on a trial-by-trial basis. By testing these three ideas in a single study using the same paradigm, we
go well beyond previous research on proactive inhibitory control, which has tended to focus on which
response settings are adjusted in anticipation of a stop signal. Ultimately, we aim to provide a com-
prehensive, integrative theoretical account of proactive inhibitory control that is strongly supported
by empirical data and grounded in the wider literatures.
First, we propose that proactive inhibitory control involves adjusting attentional settings. This
aspect of proactive control has been largely neglected or minimized in the response inhibition litera-
ture. For example, Stuphorn and Emeric (2012, p. 5) argued in their review that proactive inhibitory
control is mostly related to a regulation of the level of excitability of the motor system. However,
recent research highlights the importance of perceptual processes for reactive stopping (as discussed
above), and most of SSRT may be occupied by afferent processes (e.g. Boucher et al., 2007; Logan et al.,
2014; Salinas & Stanford, 2013). Consequently, it seems plausible that proactive inhibitory control
could also involve adjusting attentional settings to enhance detection of the stop signal on signal trials.
This idea received some support from studies by Greenhouse and Wessel (2013) and Schevernels et al.
(2015). They found that the N1, which is an event-related potential associated with stimulus detection
(see below for a detailed discussion), was larger on stop-signal trials when successful stop perfor-
mance was rewarded. This could indicate that reward-related (proactive) control adjustments could
influence signal detection. However, Greenhouse and Wessel (2013) found no N1 differences between
successful and unsuccessful signal trials, which led them to conclude that visual attention was not
related to stopping successes. Furthermore, these studies focused on stop-signal ERPs, so it is unclear
whether the modulated N1 is due to a general motivational effect that influences reactive control per-
formance (Boehler, Schevernels, Hopf, Stoppel, & Krebs, 2014) or to proactive adjustments of atten-
tional parameters. We tried to examine the latter in a stop-signal experiment in which stop signals
could occur in the center of the screen or in the periphery (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). On half
of the trials, perceptual distractors were presented throughout the trial. These distractors had the lar-
gest effect on go responses in the non-central signal blocks compared with central-signal blocks and
blocks in which no signals could occur. This suggests that subjects widened the attentional focus for
detecting the signal in the periphery in the face of interference from distractors. However, this exper-
iment was unconventional in that stop signals (especially in the non-central condition) were harder to
detect than in a typical stop-signal experiment, so it is not clear whether biasing attentional selection
is an integral component of proactive inhibitory control. Furthermore, we could not test whether sub-
jects also adjusted decisional and motor settings. Therefore, the first aim of the present study is to pro-
vide strong support for the idea that proactive inhibitory control involves modulation of all processing
stages in the go task, including attentional and response selection. As such, this study goes beyond our
previous theoretical work in which the focus was more general, and in which we also failed to
acknowledge the role of proactive attentional adjustments of attentional settings in response-
inhibition paradigms (Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014).
Second, ‘proactive inhibitory control’ typically refers to strategic adjustments in anticipation of a
stop signal, but we propose that subjects make similar proactive control adjustments in anticipation
of other acts of control. Indeed, work in other control domains indicates that people can adjust atten-
tional and response parameters when they anticipate certain events to occur (for reviews, see e.g.
Braver, 2012; Verbruggen, McLaren, et al., 2014). In interference and working-memory tasks, proactive
control involves activation of the relevant task goals, which biases activation in subordinate atten-
tional and working-memory systems (e.g. Braver, 2012; Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007). For example,
in a Stroop interference task, activation of the ‘color naming’ goal before a trial would enhance detec-
tion of the relevant color feature and reduce interference caused by irrelevant word features on incon-
gruent trials (Braver, 2012). Work in the visual attention domain (for a review, see Carrasco, 2011) has
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(Posner, 1980) or other, non-spatial, features, such as shape, color, or direction of motion (Corbetta
& Shulman, 2002). These attentional phenomena have been linked to anticipatory activity in the visual
cortex and other sensory areas (e.g. Chelazzi, Duncan, Miller, & Desimone, 1998; Kastner &
Ungerleider, 2000; Luck, Chelazzi, Hillyard, & Desimone, 1997; Sylvester, Shulman, Jack, & Corbetta,
2007). Similarly, when the control system predicts a certain action, it can proactively activate the
motor network, biasing action selection and reducing the response latency of the anticipated action
(e.g. Bestmann, 2012). Thus, there seems to be a conceptual overlap between ‘proactive inhibitory con-
trol’ (which involves according to us adjustments of attentional and response settings) and proactive
control adjustments in other domains. However, the substantial differences between control tasks
make it difficult to directly compare proactive control adjustments in different domains. Therefore,
we will test the overlap idea directly by contrasting performance in a stop-signal condition with a per-
formance in a control condition that does not require inhibition of responses, but which is otherwise
very similar to the stop condition.
Third, we propose that proactive inhibitory control involves rapidly adjusting task parameters.
Most proactive inhibitory control studies have used block-based manipulations to study proactive
inhibitory control (contrasting blocks in which no signals could occur with blocks in which signals
could occur), but some studies have demonstrated that adjustments can be made on a trial-by-trial
basis (e.g. Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). Similar dynamic adjustments of task parameters have been
demonstrated in the task-switching paradigm (e.g., Meiran, 1996; Rogers & Monsell, 1995), which
requires subjects to switch among two or more tasks (which typically use the same set of stimuli).
A robust finding in the task-switching literature is that switching between tasks is associated with
a cost, which is typically substantially reduced by providing an opportunity to prepare for the switch
(for reviews, see Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck, Liefooghe, & Verbruggen, 2010).
When changing task involves shifts of attention among locations or stimulus dimensions, a substantial
part of the switch cost has been attributed to (re)setting of attentional selection parameters (Elchlepp,
Lavric, & Monsell, 2015; Longman, Lavric, & Monsell, 2013; Longman, Lavric, Munteanu, & Monsell,
2014; Mayr, Kuhns, & Rieter, 2013). Similarly, when changing task involves updating the stimulus–re-
sponse mappings, a substantial part of the switch cost has been attributed to (re)setting the response
parameters (Kieffaber, Kruschke, Cho, Walker, & Hetrick, 2013; Meiran, Chorev, & Sapir, 2000;
Rushworth, Passingham, & Nobre, 2002; Yeung & Monsell, 2003). In Logan and Gordon’s Executive
Control of Theory of Visual Attention (ECTVA) model (Logan & Gordon, 2001), the executive system
adjusts the parameters of both the visual attention and response selection processes on dual-task
or task-switch trials; the adjustment of perceptual selection and response parameters is also at the
core of the CARIS task-set modelling framework (Meiran, 2000; Meiran, Kessler, & Adi-Japha, 2008).
By doing so, the executive control system can support flexible behavior in multi-task situations. Thus,
we propose that proactive inhibitory control can occur on a trial-by-trial basis, and that it is similar to
reconfiguring task-set parameters when switching between tasks.2. The present study
Researchers have argued that successful inhibition depends on proactive adjustments of response
thresholds and anticipatory suppression of motor activation. However, most of this work offers a
(often narrow) response-focused view on ‘proactive inhibitory control’. Here we propose that optimal
performance in stop-signal tasks and other response-inhibition paradigms requires finding a balance
between focusing on the relevant go stimuli and monitoring the environment for potentially relevant
stop signals (i.e. an optimal configuration of attentional settings), and finding a balance between going
fast on go trials and stopping when a signal occurs (i.e. an optimal configuration of response settings)
(Study Aim 1). Furthermore, we argue that proactive inhibitory control adjustments are similar to
adjustments made in other control tasks or situations (Study Aims 2 and 3).
We tested these ideas in three experiments. In each experiment, we use a modified version of the
context-cueing task (Verbruggen, Aron, Stevens, & Chambers, 2010), in which subjects performed a
color judgment in three possible task contexts (ignore, stop, and double-response respectively). On
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‘++++’ for double-response) specified the context; we refer to it as the ‘cue’. When the string turned
yellow or green (thus becoming a ‘go stimulus’), subjects initiated a go response (this was their pri-
mary task). On a minority of trials, the colored go stimulus turned bold (the ‘signal’) after a variable
delay: in the ignore context (signal-ignore trials), subjects had to ignore the signal and execute the
go response (i.e. they could always respond); in the stop context (stop-signal trials), subjects were
instructed to withhold the primary (go) response; and in the double-response context (double-
response-signal trials), subjects had to execute an additional response following the go response by
pressing an alternate key. In a previous study (Verbruggen et al., 2010), we used a variant of this task
to examine reactive inhibitory control after transcranial magnetic stimulation of the right inferior
frontal junction and the right inferior frontal gyrus. We included the double-response condition to test
the specificity of the reactive control mechanisms: on both the double-response and stop-signal trials,
subjects must detect an extra signal and subsequently select an appropriate (non-dominant) response.
A detailed analysis revealed that reactive inhibitory control mechanisms on stop-signal trials over-
lapped strongly with the cognitive mechanisms underlying the execution of the secondary response
on double-response signal trials.1
In the present study, we used the context-cueing task to examine proactive inhibitory control. We
combined the context-cueing paradigm with event-related potentials (ERPs). ERPs are an online mea-
sure of neural activity, with an excellent temporal resolution, providing the opportunity to monitor
how proactive inhibitory control modulates attentional and response settings. In order to get a ‘pure’
measure of proactive control (i.e., adjustments in anticipation of an event), we will focus on no-signal
trials.
A comparison of no-signal ERPs in the ‘ignore’ and ‘stop’ contexts can reveal to what extent people
adjust both attentional and response settings when they expect a stop signal in the near future (Study
Aim 1). Our account postulates that people alter the settings of the lower-level perceptual and
response systems to find a balance between going fast on no-signal trials and stopping on a signal trial.
Therefore, we expect that proactive inhibitory control will influence the processing of the go stimuli,
the selection of the appropriate go response, and its execution. In particular, any differences between
the ignore and stop contexts regarding the detection of visual stimuli should be reflected in early sen-
sory ERP components such as the N1 and/or Selection Negativity (e.g., Anllo-Vento, Luck, & Hillyard,
1998; Luck & Kappenman, 2012; Potts & Tucker, 2001; Schupp et al., 2007; Vogel & Luck, 2000;
Wills, Lavric, Hemmings, & Surrey, 2014, for review). Any differences between the ignore and stop
contexts in allocation of attentional resources (e.g., Johnson, 1986; Johnson & Jr., 1984; Kramer,
Wickens, & Donchin, 1985), in response-selection settings, or both, should be reflected in the P3
(e.g., Verleger, Jaskowski, & Wascher, 2005). Finally, any differences between the contexts in
response-execution settings should be reflected in the response-locked LRPs (e.g., Smulders &
Miller, 2012).
We included the double-response context to examine the specificity of the proactive control
adjustments (Study Aim 2). Based on the overlap in reactive control mechanisms (see above), we pre-
dict an overlap between preparing for a stop signal and preparing for a double-response signal. Thus,
any changes to no-signal ERP components in the stop context should also be observed in the double-
response context.
Third, we also measured an ERP correlate of the setting (adjustment) of task parameters to examine
whether proactive control in response-inhibition tasks is similar to preparatory control of a task set
when switching between completely different tasks (also referred to as anticipatory ‘task-set reconfig-
uration’, Lavric, Mizon, & Monsell, 2008; Monsell, 2003) (Study Aim 3). In the most widely used ver-
sion of the task-switching paradigm, ‘task-cueing’ (Meiran, 1996), a cue presented before stimulus1 The right inferior frontal junction was primarily involved in detecting the infrequent signals in the double-response and stop-
signal contexts (attentional selection), whereas the right inferior frontal gyrus was primarily involved in selecting the double-
response or the stop response (action selection). These findings indicate that the right ventrolateral prefrontal cortex is involved in
both attentional and action selection in various action control tasks. This idea is further supported by recent neuro-imaging studies
(e.g., Dodds, Morein-Zamir, & Robbins, 2011; Erika-Florence, Leech, & Hampshire, 2014; Hampshire, Chamberlain, Monti, Duncan,
& Owen, 2010; Levy & Wagner, 2011).
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cue and reconfigure the task-set parameters in advance of the imperative stimulus (see above). Sim-
ilarly, in our task subjects could interpret the (black) context cue and adjust processing parameters
accordingly prior to the presentation of the (colored) go stimulus. Thus, in addition to using the
above-mentioned ERP components that should reflect the application and maintenance of (adjusted)
control parameters (N1, SN, P3 and LRP), we were also interested in an ERP correlate of the setting
(adjustment) as it unfolds. More specifically, we examined whether the presentation of the context
cue was associated with a component typically found in preparation intervals in task-switching stud-
ies, namely the posterior switch-related positivity (see Karayanidis et al., 2010, for a review). The mag-
nitude of this switch positivity correlates with successful switching performance, both within and
across subjects (Elchlepp, Lavric, Mizon, & Monsell, 2012; Karayanidis, Provost, Brown, Paton, &
Heathcote, 2011; Lavric et al., 2008). This has led to the conclusion that the posterior switch positivity
is an ERP correlate of dynamic and anticipatory task-set reconfiguration (Karayanidis et al., 2010,
2011; Lavric et al., 2008; but see Kang, DiRaddo, Logan, & Woodman, 2014, for a different interpreta-
tion of the posterior positivity). If our assumptions about proactive inhibitory control are correct, then
switching to a context that potentially requires an act of control should necessitate an adjustment of
task parameters, just like when switching to another task. Therefore, we predict that switching to
another action context should elicit a posterior positivity (relative to repeating the same context) in
the late part of the preparation interval – the interval between the cue and the go stimulus.3. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, subjects responded to the color of a go stimulus in the primary task (the ‘go’ task).
On a minority of the trials, the stimulus turned bold, instructing the subjects to withhold their go
response (the ‘stop context’) or to execute a second response (‘the double-response’) context. The con-
text changed on 2/3 of the trials. To examine the consequences of proactive inhibitory control, we
focused on four ERP components in the primary go task: the N1, the Selection Negativity (SN), the
P3, and the response-locked Lateralised Readiness Potential (LRP). The first two components have
been associated with stimulus detection and perceptual (feature) selection, respectively, whereas
the latter two have been associated with response selection and response execution, respectively.
Finally, to examine the online setting (adjustment) of the parameters and the overlap between proac-
tive inhibitory control and task switching, we focused on the posterior positivity.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Subjects
Thirty-two right-handed adults (25 female) with an average age of 20 (ranging from 18 to 30) were
paid £15 for participation in this study. Eleven subjects were replaced, one due to high error rates and
ten due to low trial numbers in the ERP averages (please see under ‘EEG and ERP’ section for the
numerous exclusion criteria for the no-signal trial analyses; combined with the exclusions due to
eye blink and muscle artifacts, these criteria led to an unusually high number of excluded subjects).
The subject- and trial-specific exclusion criteria or filters were decided prior to hypothesis testing.
3.1.2. Apparatus, stimuli, paradigm, and procedure
The task was programmed in E-prime (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). The trial structure
and example stimuli are presented in Fig. 1. The stimuli were presented on a TFT monitor against a
gray background in Lucinda Console font, size 24, subtending 1.9 visual angle.
There were two preparation conditions, separated into different experimental blocks (see below).
In the ‘preparation’ condition (3/4 of the blocks), each trial started with the presentation of a black
fixation dot in the center of the screen for 200 ms, followed by a ‘cue’ (a black string of letters or sym-
bols) that specified the relevant context: ‘IGNR’ or ‘====’ indicated the ignore context; ‘HOLD’ or
‘XXXX’ indicated the stop context; ‘DUAL’ or ‘++++’ indicated the double-response context. After
800 ms, the black string turned yellow or green (i.e. the cue became a ‘go stimulus’). The primary task
Fig. 1. Trial structure and example stimuli.
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‘m’ on a QWERTY keyboard with the left or right index finger, respectively. The color-response map-
ping (e.g. green = m, yellow = c) was counterbalanced across subjects. The color stimulus stayed on the
screen until a response was executed. In the ‘no preparation’ condition (1/4 of the blocks) the fixation
dot was immediately followed by the colored string (the go stimulus; e.g., ‘HOLD’ in green). This con-
dition was included to determine whether subjects took the opportunity to prepare for the upcoming
context in the ‘preparation’ condition: in both conditions the identity of the string specified the con-
text, but only in the ‘preparation’ condition this information was available (in the form of the black
cue) in advance of the to-be-identified color.
On 25% of the trials in both preparation conditions, the go stimulus turned bold (signal trials) after
one of three intervals (stimulus onset asynchronies or SOAs: 100, 250 or 400 ms). The SOAs were the
same for all three contexts, and occurred randomly and with equal probability. In the ignore context,
subjects were instructed to ignore the signal and respond to the color of the stimulus only; in the stop
context, subjects were instructed to withhold the color response when the signal appeared; in the
double-response context, subjects were instructed to respond to the signal by pressing the space
bar with the left or right thumb after they responded to the color. Furthermore, subjects were told
not to wait for the stop signal to occur and were informed that it would be easy to stop on some trials
and difficult or impossible to stop on other trials. For double-response signal trials, they were told to
execute the two responses independently, as quickly as possible, and not to group responses. (Subjects
using a grouping strategy would select the go response – i.e. ‘c’ or ‘m’ – but then hold it waiting until
the second response – i.e. the space-bar – was also ready to be initiated; cf. Ulrich & Miller, 2008). On
signal trials, the colored string remained on the screen for 2 s (regardless RT or SOA).
The context changed unpredictably on 2/3 of the trials. The identity of the go stimulus (and that of
the cue in the ‘preparation’ condition) was never the same as on the previous trial, even when the con-
text remained the same as on the previous trial (e.g., when the stop context was repeated ‘HOLD’ was
always followed by a ‘XXXX’ and vice versa). This was done because in task switching it has been
shown that changing the task cue results in a performance cost, even when the task is repeated
(e.g., Logan & Bundesen, 2003, and Monsell & Mizon, 2006).
The session startedwith nine blocks of practice of 49–50 trials each. In the first three blocks subjects
practiced each context separately. In the following six blocks theypracticed switching between contexts
(five preparation blocks and one no-preparation block). The experimental part of the session (during
which behavioral and EEG data were collected) comprised 24 blocks, of which 18 contained 49 trials
and6 contained50 trials:Given the25%probabilityof a signal trial, onequarter of theblocks startedwith
a signal trial followed by a filler trial, which were both discarded from the behavioral and EEG analyses
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subject to the following constraints: the probability of a context switch (2/3) was the same for signal
and no-signal trials for each stimulus type (i.e. words or symbol strings); all context switches (ignore-
stop, ignore-double, stop-ignore, stop-double, double-ignore, double-stop) were equiprobable; and
the probability of a signalwas the same for each stimulus type by context combination. A new sequence
was generated for each participant whilst enforcing these constraints separately for each preparation
condition. No-preparation blocks were interspersed among preparation blocks so that one no-
preparation block was followed by three preparation blocks (e.g., nP-P-P-P-nP-P-P-P . . .). To avoid con-
founding practice effects with preparation effects, we counterbalanced the starting point of this
sequence across subjects (e.g., Subject 1: P-nP-P-P-P . . .; Subject 2: P-P-nP-P-P-P . . .).
3.1.3. EEG data acquisition
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was acquired using 64 Ag/AgCl active electrodes (ActiCap, Brain
Products, Munich, Germany) connected to BrainAmp amplifiers (Brain Products, Munich, Germany).
The EEG was sampled continuously at 500 Hz with a bandpass of 0.016–100 Hz, the reference at Cz
and the ground at AFz. There were 62 electrodes on the scalp in an extended 10–20 configuration
and one on each earlobe. Their impedances were kept below 10 kX.
3.1.4. Analyses
All raw and processed behavioral and EEG data are deposited in the Open Research Exeter data
repository (http://hdl.handle.net/10871/19336). We will focus on performance on no-signal trials to
get ‘pure’ measures of proactive control (see above); for completeness, we present the signal data
in Appendix A.
3.1.4.1. Behavioral analyses. Trials following an incorrect response, trials following a signal trial, and
the first trial of each block (which cannot be classified as a context switch or repeat) were excluded
from the analyses. Incorrect trials were also excluded from the no-signal RT analysis. No-signal per-
formance was analyzed using univariate analyses of variance with context, context repetition, and
preparation condition as within-subject factors. In planned follow-up analyses, we contrasted the
stop and ignore contexts to examine proactive inhibitory control adjustments, and the double-
response context with the ignore and stop contexts to examine the generality of these adjustments.
3.1.4.2. ERPs. Because the total number of no-preparation trials and the number of signal trials were
low, we only analyzed ERPs for no-signal trials in the preparation condition. The EEG was filtered off-
line with a 20 Hz low-pass (48 dB/oct) and a 0.1 Hz high pass (24 dB/oct) filter, and re-referenced to
the linked ears. To correct eye blink artifacts, we ran an Independent Component Analysis (Infomax
ICA, Bell & Sejnovski, 1995), implemented in Vision Analyzer (BrainProducts, Munich, Germany).
Sixty-three ICA components were obtained from every subject’s EEG (the same as the number of elec-
trodes submitted to ICA). For each subject we excluded on average eight components with character-
istic eye-blink and eye-movement topographies and time-courses. Following this ICA-based artifact
subtraction, the EEG was segmented into 1800 ms epochs, time-locked to the presentation of the
cue and baseline-corrected relative to the average amplitude of the 100 ms preceding the cue. The
long segments were further sub-segmented into: 100 ms to 800 ms segments time locked to
the presentation of the cue, and 100 ms to 1000 ms time locked to the presentation of the go stim-
ulus. For both ERP segments, we used the same pre-cue baseline (i.e., the 100 ms interval before the
cue onset).2 For response-locked LRPs, segments were cut from 700 ms preceding the response to
200 ms following the response, and the first 100 ms of that segment (from 700 to 600 ms) were used
as a baseline.2 A baseline in the interval immediately preceding the go stimulus is problematic if one anticipates in this interval substantial
amplitude differences between conditions, such as the switch vs. repeat positivity documented in the task-switching literature
(e.g., Elchlepp et al., 2012). Baseline correction is the subtraction of the mean amplitude of the baseline from each time-sample
following the baseline. Assuming the difference present during the baseline interval would soon dissipate, this difference would be
‘propagated forward’ later in the go stimulus segment, only with a polarity reversal (a switch-induced positivity during the
baseline would result in an apparent, yet entirely artifactual, extended switch-induced negativity later in the ERP segment).
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with incorrect no-signal trials, segments following errors, segments corresponding to the first trial
of a block, signal trials, and trials following a signal. The resulting segments were visually inspected
for residual ocular, muscle, movement and other artifacts, and segments containing such artifacts
were removed. The remaining EEG segments were averaged for every subject and experimental con-
dition. Subjects’ cue-locked averages contained around 80 trials for context switches and around 40
trials for context repeats (this difference originated from having three contexts with two-thirds con-
text switches and one third context repeats).3 Go stimulus-locked ERP averages contained about 60 tri-
als for each context (here we averaged over switch-repeat because there were no effects or interactions
involving switching; see Results section).
In our previous task-cueing studies, the switch-related positivity emerged around 400 ms after cue
onset with maximal amplitudes at 600–800 ms (e.g., Elchlepp et al., 2012; Lavric et al., 2008). For our
analysis we therefore averaged amplitudes in the time window between 400 and 800 ms. Given the
posterior maximum of the switch positivity, we averaged ERP amplitudes within this interval for
groups of electrodes in left, middle and right parietal and occipital regions of the scalp (see Fig. 2)
and submitted them to a 3 (laterality) by 2 (region) ANOVA. When components with a relatively broad
scalp distribution are investigated, averaging over scalp regions grossly based on cortical anatomy is a
common approach in ERP research in general, and ERP task-switching studies in particular (e.g.,
Elchlepp et al., 2012; Goffaux, Phillips, Sinai, & Pushkar, 2006; Lavric et al., 2008; Poljac & Yeung,
2014; Poulsen, Luu, Davey, & Tucker, 2005). This approach avoids (or reduces the severity) of the prob-
lem of electrode selection for the analysis, it improves signal-to-noise ratio via spatial smoothing, and,
most importantly, enables tests of differences in scalp distribution (e.g. by using topographic factors in
the ANOVA).
As mentioned in Footnote 2, residual cue-related activity could spill over into the ERP segment
time-locked to the go stimulus. To avoid such contamination of differences in early perceptual com-
ponents, we used peak-to-peak measures for the analyses of amplitude differences in the N1 and the
Selection Negativity: the N1 amplitude was quantified as the N1-P1 difference, and the amplitude of
the Selection Negativity (SN) as the difference between the P2 and the first negative peak following
the P2 for each participant and context. There was no reason to expect a lateralization of these early
visual components (the stimuli were presented centrally), hence their amplitudes were quantified as
peak amplitude in electrodes PO8 and PO7 and subsequently averaged over these electrodes.
Existing analyses of the time-course of the preparation switch-related positivity (by means of tem-
poral PCA, Elchlepp et al., 2012) suggest that the spillover of this effect from the preparation interval
should dissipate by the time the P3 rises. Hence, we quantified the amplitude of the P3 as the mean
amplitude over the 300–500 ms interval to capture the broad range of this component (instead of the
peak-to-peak procedure employed for the N1 and the SN). To capture the typical P3 topography, we
averaged amplitudes of electrodes in the posterior frontal, parietal and occipital middle regions of
the scalp (see Fig. 2). In the main P3 analysis, amplitudes of all electrodes in these regions were aver-
aged – so as to employ the same statistical test as for the N1 and the SN, enabling correction for the
inflation in Type 1 error over all the tests conducted for the three components (N1, SN and P3). How-
ever, components from the P3 family can have different scalp distributions (the frontal P3b and the
posterior P3b). Hence, we also tested for differences between regions (P3a, P3b) with an ANOVA
including the factors context and region (see the Results section).
Finally, we calculated the Lateralised Readiness Potential (LRP), using the standard procedure (e.g.,
Coles, 1989) implemented in Brain Vision Analyser. Preparing a motor response results in a negative
wave over the motor cortex contralateral to the response hand (the Readiness Potential, e.g., Deecke,
Grozinger, & Kornhuber, 1976). To isolate this activation and distinguish it from non-lateralised ERP
deflections occurring at about the same time (e.g., the P3) we subtracted the amplitude in an electrode
positioned over the motor cortex ipsilateral to the responding hand (C4 for right hand and C3 for left3 To avoid excessive fatigue in our subjects we aimed to keep the duration of the experiment at around 1 h, excluding the EEG
preparation procedures. This meant that the trial number in the smallest cell for the ERP analysis (long CSI, no-signal context
repeat trials) was 54 at the start. We had previously established that each subjects’ ERP average should contain at least 20 trials.
After applying the exclusion criteria ten subjects had less than 20 trials left and were therefore excluded.
Fig. 2. Electrode grouping into regions.
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responses) and averaged the results of the left and right hand subtractions. Waveforms were
smoothed with a low-pass digital filter (with a high-frequency cutoff at 8 Hz; e.g., De Jong, Coles, &
Logan, 1995). Given this LRP derivation procedure, lateralization can only arise once the decision of
which hand to use is made. The LRP time-locked to the onset of the response is informative about
the duration of response activation and peripheral motor processes and thus provides additional
insight to what is learned from the analyses of the components in the go stimulus-locked ERPs (N1,
SN, and P3).
We analyzed onset latency, peak amplitude and peak latency of the r-LRP using the ‘‘jackknifing”
method (Miller, Patterson, & Ulrich, 1998), which has been developed to deal with the difficulties of
identifying ERP morphological features and determining their latencies in individual subjects. Instead
of using the individual subjects’ ERPs to calculate the standard error, this procedure calculates it based
on sub-averages of all subjects but one (e.g., for 32 subjects 32 sub-averages are created, first leaving
out subject 1, then subject 2, etc., until subject 32 is left out). Even with the help of jackknifing, accu-
rate estimation of ERP components can be challenging and different onset estimation methods have
been found superior in different circumstances (for reviews on detecting the LRP onset, see Miller
et al., 1998, and Mordkoff & Gianaros, 2000). We therefore chose two of these methods in an attempt
to obtain converging evidence. First, we determined the onset as the time when the r-LRP waveform
reached 30% of its peak amplitude. Second, we fitted a bilinear function and used the inflection point
between the best-fitting two linear segments as an estimate of the onset (this procedure is described
in detail in Appendix B). We applied a strict conjunction criterion: a difference between experimental
conditions (contexts) was only conclusive if it was statistically significant in both onset analyses.
For statistical analysis, we used t-tests to run planned pairwise comparisons of different levels of
one factor (i.e., the pairwise contrasts between the experimental contexts) and univariate analyses
of variance whenever there was more than one factor and the interaction was tested (i.e., the interac-
tion between the factors context and switch in the analysis of the preparation interval, and the inter-
action between context and region in the P3 analysis). For the paired samples t-tests, we used Cohen’
dav to calculate the effects sizes (Lakens, 2013) and the Holm–Bonferroni method (Holm, 1979) to con-
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tests: (1) the ERP analysis time-locked to the cue (where multiple comparisons were needed to follow
up the ANOVA), (2) the ERP analyses time-locked to the go stimulus (where multiple comparisons
were conducted to examine the stimulus-locked components N1, SN and P3), and (3) the ERP analysis
time-locked to the response, where multiple tests were required to assess differences in r-LRP latency
and amplitude; the correction was applied separately to the subsets of tests conducted on the r-LRP
onset latency, peak latency and peak amplitude. For the ANOVAs, significance levels were adjusted
using the Huynh–Feldt correction for violations of sphericity (but unadjusted degrees of freedom
are reported).3.2. Results and discussion
3.2.1. Behavioral results
Descriptive statistics for no-signal trials (mean RTs and error rates) are shown in Tables 1 and 2,
respectively; inferential statistics are given in Table 3.
The signal data are presented in Appendix A.
Consistent with previous work, we found that no-signal RTs were influenced by context (p < .001;
Table 3). Planned comparisons revealed that mean no-signal RTs were significantly longer in the stop
context (789 ms) than in the ignore context (644 ms), t(31) = 7.2, p < .001, dav = 1.23. This indicates
that subjects adopted a more cautious response strategy in the context in which stop signals could
occur. RTs were also longer in the double-response context (726 ms) than in the ignore context
(644 ms), t(31) = 5.59, p < .001, dav = .67. Thus, the dual-task requirement in the double-response con-
dition also slowed RTs. Finally, RTs were longer in the stop context than in the double-response con-
text, t(31) = 6.15, p < .001, dav = .50, indicating that the behavioral effect of proactive control
adjustements was most pronounced when subjects anticipated a stop signal.
The effect of advance preparation differed for the three contexts (interaction: p < .01, see Table 3):
in the ignore and double-response context, RTs were shorter (by about 90 ms) in the preparation con-
dition than in the no-preparation condition, which suggests that subjects encoded the cue and pre-
pared for the upcoming context in the preparation condition. In the stop context, this reduction
was much smaller (about 50 ms). In this context, advance preparation could produce slowing as sub-
jects have time to adopt a more cautious response strategy before the stimulus appears (see e.g.
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). This can also explain why RTs were numerically shorter on context-
switch trials than on context-repetition trials in this stop context (Table 1): on repetition trials, sub-
jects have already implemented a more cautious response strategy, resulting in longer reaction times.Table 1
Mean (sd in parentheses) RTs and switch costs (se in parentheses) for no-signal trials in all conditions (in ms).
Long CSI Short CSI
Switch Repeat Switch cost Switch Repeat Switch cost
Ignore 604 (115) 593 (118) 11 (6) 685 (101) 692 (151) 7 (15)
Double 684 (134) 675 (136) 9 (4) 781 (131) 764 (140) 17 (10)
Stop 755 (124) 773 (128) 17 (7) 812 (124) 815 (125) 3 (12)
Table 2
Mean error rates (sd in parentheses) and error switch costs (se in parentheses) for no-signal trials in all conditions (in %).
Long CSI Short CSI
Switch Repeat Switch cost Switch Repeat Switch cost
Ignore 1.9 (1.9) 2.3 (2.4) 0.4 (0.5) 3.6 (3.4) 4.3 (5.1) 0.7 (1)
Double 1.9 (1.6) 1.7 (1.8) 0.2 (0.4) 3.9 (4.6) 2.8 (3.6) 1.1 (1.1)
Stop 1.5 (1.7) 1.1 (1.3) 0.4 (0.4) 2.0 (2.6) 1.6 (3.2) 0.4 (0.7)
Table 3
Overview of repeated measures ANOVAs on RTs and error rates.
df 1 df 2 F p Partial g2
RTs
CSI 1 31 119.1 <.001 0.793
Context 2 62 43.7 <.001 0.585
Switch 1 31 0.21 0.65 0.007
Context  CSI 2 62 8.23 <.01 0.120
Context  switch 2 62 2.69 0.95 0.080
CSI  switch 1 31 0.54 0.81 0.002
Context  CSI  switch 2 62 1.49 0.23 0.046
Ignore context only
CSI 1 31 83.45 <.001 0.729
Switch 1 31 0.56 0.81 0.002
CSI  switch 1 31 1.20 0.23 0.037
Double-response context only
CSI 1 31 67.65 <.001 0.686
Switch 1 31 7.85 <.01 0.202
CSI  switch 1 31 0.58 0.45 0.018
Stop context only
CSI 1 31 37.87 <.001 0.550
Switch 1 31 2.12 0.16 0.064
CSI  switch 1 31 1.16 0.29 0.036
Errors
CSI 1 31 22.61 <.001 0.422
Context 2 62 10.20 <.001 0.248
Switch 1 31 0.20 0.66 0.006
Context  CSI 2 62 2.31 0.1 0.069
Context  switch 2 62 1.6 0.21 0.049
CSI  switch 1 31 0.82 0.77 0.003
Context  CSI  switch 2 62 0.41 0.67 0.013
Ignore context only
CSI 1 31 9.29 <.01 0.231
Switch 1 31 0.81 0.38 0.025
CSI  switch 1 31 0.12 0.74 0.004
Double-response context only
CSI 1 31 12.98 <.01 0.295
Switch 1 31 1.25 0.27 0.039
CSI  switch 1 31 0.60 0.45 0.019
Stop context only
CSI 1 31 1.81 0.19 0.055
Switch 1 31 0.75 0.39 0.024
CSI  switch 1 31 0.001 0.98 <.001
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In this section, we report the analyses of the ERPs for no-signal trials in the preparation condition.
First, we report the analyses of the ERPs following the onset of the go stimulus (i.e., the interval after
the stimulus changed color) to examine which processing stages in the go task are influenced by
proactive inhibitory control (Study Aim 1), and how context-specific these adjustments are (Study
Aim 2). Then we examine the preparation interval (i.e. the interval between the presentation of the
cue and the go stimulus) where we predicted a posterior positivity when context changed relatively
to a context repetition, by analogy with the task-switching literature (Study Aim 3).3.2.2.1. ERPs following the onset of the go stimulus. To explore possible effects of switching and context,
we divided the ERPs into 100 ms bins, from 0 to 700 ms following go stimulus onset. ERPs differed
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p’s > .4). We also tested for potential effects of switch on each ERP component reported below but
failed to discover any (these analyses are presented in Appendix C). The lack of evidence for switch
effects in the post-stimulus intervals suggests that subjects used the preparation interval effectively
to prepare for a switch to the upcoming context, as discussed in more detail below. In the absence
of significant interactions with switching, we averaged switch and repeat ERP amplitudes for each
context to augment the signal-to-noise ratio for these ERP data.
3.2.2.1.1. N1. We use the N1 is a marker of stimulus detection, as it reflects the perception of a visual
or auditory stimulus (with different scalp distributions for the two modalities: a posterior scalp dis-
tribution for the visual modality, and a central scalp distribution for the auditory modality). For both
modalities, previous studies indicate that N1 amplitudes are larger when more attention is directed to
perceiving the stimulus (e.g., Luck, Heinze, Mangun, & Hillyard, 1990; Vogel & Luck, 2000, for the
visual N1; e.g., Hillyard, Hink, Schwent, & Picton, 1973, for the auditory N1). Grand average N1 ampli-
tudes in electrodes PO8 and PO7 are shown in Fig. 3A. The mean N1 amplitude (using the peak-to-peak
measure – the N1-P1 difference) was largest in the stop context, 6.6 lV, followed by the double-
response context, 6.3 lV, and smallest in the ignore context, 5.9 lV. The difference between the
stop and ignore context was significant, t(31) = 3.48, p < .05, dav = .24. This suggests that more atten-
tion is directed to the color (go) stimulus in the stop context. More specifically, proactive control
exerted in the preparation interval may have led to an increased gain in visual cortex in anticipation
of the visual stop signal. The differences between the double-response and the ignore context and the
stop and double-response contexts were not significant, t(31) = 1.94, p = .2, dav = .14, and t(31) = 1.68,
p < .3, dav = .1, respectively.
3.2.2.1.2. Selection Negativity. The next component to be modulated by context was the Selection
Negativity (see Fig. 3A for grand average waveforms in electrodes PO7 and PO8), which has been
argued to reflect the continued processing of a visual stimulus with the aim of detecting a particular
feature (Anllo-Vento & Hillyard, 1996; Potts & Tucker, 2001; Schupp et al., 2007; Wills et al., 2014).
The SN amplitude (quantified from the preceding peak, P2, see Method) was significantly larger in
the stop context (3.55 lV) than in the ignore context (2.57 lV), t(31) = 3.23, p < .05, dav = .5, which
indicates that subjects monitored for the go stimulus to turn bold. The differences between the
double-response (3.39 lV) and the ignore and stop contexts were not significant, t(31) = 2.58,
p = .07, dav = .41, and t(31) = 0.7, p = .5, dav = .07, respectively.
3.2.2.1.3. P3. The P3 presumably reflects resource allocation during the decision-making process
(Johnson, 1984; Johnson & Donchin, 1982; Kramer et al., 1985) and/or linking the decision with the
correct response (Verleger et al., 2005). T-tests on P3 amplitude showed it to be larger in the ignore
context (4.5 lV) than in the stop (3.1 lV) and double-response (3.4 lV) contexts, t(31) = 3.92,
p < .01, dav = 0.61, and t(31) = 4.31, p < .01, dav = 0.46, respectively (see also Fig. 3B). The difference
between the double-response and stop contexts was not significant, t(31) = 1.45, p = .3, dav = 0.16.
Appendix D shows the P3 analysis as a function of region. No significant interactions with region were
found.
Although the P3 is one of the most widely studied components there is no universal agreement on
its functional interpretation. The amplitude of the P3 may be sensitive to stimulus uncertainty
(Johnson, 1984, 1986) and attentional demands (e.g. Kramer et al., 1985). In our double-response
and stop-signal contexts, there was uncertainty if and when a signal would occur, and monitoring
for the signal might have drawn attention away from processing the primary task stimulus. Both could
have reduced the P3 amplitude (Johnson, 1984, 1986; Kramer et al., 1985). Furthermore, Verleger et al.
(2005) found that the P3 amplitude was smaller and had a much broader peak (due to more temporal
jitter) when the response decision was difficult compared to when it was easy. In Experiment 1,
response difficulty could also have contributed to smaller P3 amplitudes in the dual-task contexts
in which subjects occasionally had to select an alternative action plan. Thus, our results are in line
with these influential accounts of the P3, linking it to stimulus evaluation, attentional resource allo-
cation and early stages of response selection.
3.2.2.1.4. Lateralised Readiness Potential. The r-LRP (Fig. 3C) reached 30% of peak amplitude at 271 ms
for double-response context, at 238 ms for the stop context, and at 220 ms for the ignore context.
The r-LRP onset estimate obtained by bilinear fitting was the earliest (in relation to the response) for
Fig. 3. Experiment 1, post go stimulus waveforms for all contexts: A in electrodes PO8 (left) and PO7 (right), B in Cz, C response-
locked LRPs.
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ignore context (316 ms). Jackknifing-based t-tests revealed that the two methods of comparing r-
LRP onsets converged in finding a significantly earlier onset in the double-response context than in
the ignore context (30%, t(31) = 3.06, p < .05; bilinear, t(31) = 5.18, p < .001). The remaining com-
parisons (stop vs. ignore, stop vs. double-response) were both significant in the bilinear analysis,
but not in the 30% analysis (for the statistics, see Appendix E).
We also examined the amplitude and latency of the r-LRP peaks. The peak amplitudes for the dif-
ferent contexts were 1.3 lV in the stop context, 1.5 lV in the double-response context, and
1.4 lV in the ignore context. These amplitude differences were not significant (all p’s > .1). The peak
latencies were 100 ms in the stop context, 120 ms in the double-response context, and 112 ms in
the ignore context. These differences were also not significant (all p’s > .1).
The r-LRP marks the last stage of action programming; it arises before the movement is executed.
The interval between its onset and the response reflects how long it takes to program and implement
an action. Previous research indicates that motor output is suppressed when subjects expect a stop-
signal to occur (e.g., Cai et al., 2011). The numerical r-LRP onset differences were consistent with these
findings: r-LRP onset was earlier (i.e. the interval between the LRP onset and the execution of the
response was longer) in the stop- and double-response contexts in than in the ignore context. How-
ever, only the double-response vs. ignore difference was significant in both r-LRP analyses. Therefore,
these r-LRP onset differences should be interpreted with caution.
3.2.2.2. Preparation interval. This analysis focusedon theeffect of preparation for a context after just hav-
ing performed one ormore trials in a different context, or in otherwords, the effect of switching to a new
context compared to repeating the same. ERP studies of task switching consistently find more positive
amplitudes on the posterior scalp for switch compared to repeat trials in the later part of the preparation
interval (e.g., Karayanidis, Coltheart,Michie, &Murphy, 2003; Lavric et al., 2008;Nicholson, Karayanidis,
Poboka, Heathcote, &Michie, 2005). Fig. 4 shows the waveforms for switch and repeat for all three con-
texts in representative electrodes, and topographies of the switch-repeat differences. Here we describe
only effects or interactions with the factor switch in detail. We found a main effect of switch, F(1,31)
= 11.51, p < .01, partial g2 = .271, and a switch by region interaction, F(1,31) = 9.21, p < .01, partial
g2 = .229. Although the interaction between switch and context failed to reach significance (F(2,62)
= 2.65, p = .08, partial g2 = .079), it was important to determine which context(s) showed statistically
reliable effects of switch. We therefore conducted separate analyses to examine the switch-repeat
Fig. 4. Experiment 1, A waveforms for switch and repeat for all contexts in electrodes PO5, POz and PO6, and B topographies of
the switch – repeat differences.
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partial g2 = .274, but not in the double-response context, F(1,31) = 3.71, p = .1, partial g2 = .107, or the
ignore context, F(1,31) = 0.2, p = .66, partial g2 = .006. Therewere no significant interactionswith region
in any of the contexts (stop, p > .16; double-response, p > .6; ignore, p > .3).
These findings suggest that when subjects switched to a context in which stop signals could occur,
they used the preparation interval to actively prepare for this potential task demand. It seems unlikely
that this reflects a response-inhibition specific process because the time-course and scalp distribution
of the observed switch positivity closely resembles that of the posterior switch positivity found in ERP
42 H. Elchlepp et al. / Cognitive Psychology 86 (2016) 27–61task-switching studies4 that did not require stopping an already planned response. Instead, it is more
consistent with the idea that proactive inhibitory control is similar to preparing to switch tasks. We will
come back to this in the General Discussion. This finding also contributes to the debate on whether
proactive strategy adjustments can be made on a trial-by-trial basis. For example, in studies by Brown
and Steyvers (2005), Los (1999), and Strayer and Kramer (1994), subjects did not seem to make use of
pre-cues to proactively prepare their response strategies. Other studies found proactive adjustments only
under certain conditions, for example when there was a requirement to respond as fast as possible
(Gopher, Armony, & Greenshpan, 2000; Kleinsorge, 2001; Los, 1999). Our behavioral and electrophysio-
logical results unambiguously show that proactive inhibitory control strategies can be employed on a
trial-by-trial basis (see also Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a).
3.3. Interim conclusion
Experiment 1 provides clear answers to three main questions raised in the Introduction. First, the
analysis of post-go-stimulus ERPs showed that proactive inhibitory control influenced both the per-
ceptual processing of the go stimulus and the selection of the go response on no-signal trials. More
specifically, we found differences in the N1 with larger amplitudes in the stop context than in the
ignore context, which could reflect increased attention on stimulus processing in the stop context
(e.g., Luck, Fan, & Hillyard, 1993). The amplitude of the Selection Negativity, which could be seen as
a marker of signal monitoring, was also larger in the stop context than in the ignore context. This sug-
gests a more thorough perceptual analysis of the go stimulus in anticipation of it turning bold. Finally,
modulations of the P3 suggest that response-selection processes were modulated by task context.
Combined, these results indicate that proactive inhibitory control modulated different processing
stages in the go task, which is consistent with the idea that subjects try to balance task demands
by adjusting parameters of subordinate processes to enhance detection of the stop signal and to pre-
vent premature go responses (Study Aim 1).
Second, the P3 and r-LRP analyses indicate that subjects also made proactive control adjustments
in the double-response task. The analyses of the N1 and the SN also revealed numerical differences
between the double-response context and the ignore context, but these failed to reach significance.
These results suggest similarities between proactive control in the stop and double-response contexts,
but also some (probably quantitative) differences (Study Aim 2).
Third, the marker of task-set reconfiguration found in task-switching ERP studies, the posterior
switch positivity, was also present when preparing for a switch to the stop context. This indicates that
there is indeed a functional overlap between proactive inhibitory control and task switching, which is
consistent with the idea that both involve anticipatory updating of task-set parameters (Study Aim 3).
We should note that the probability of responding on stop-signal trials was lower than in previous
stop-signal studies (see Appendix A). This could indicate that subjects simply waited for the signal to
occur and that they decided after the longest SOA had elapsed whether to initiate a go response or not.
However, a careful analysis of the stop-signal data suggests that subjects engaged in the inhibition of
an initiated go response on stop-signal trials. In Fig. A1 in Appendix A, we show inhibition functions
for Experiments 1–3. These functions plot the relation between p(respond|signal) and the stop signal
delay (SSD), and are important theoretically because they reflect the outcome of the race between the
go process and the stop process (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). The independent horse-race model of
Logan and Cowan (1984) assumes that the SSD will influence the relative finishing time of the stop
process: when SSD increases, the stop process will start later and therefore, finish later compared
to the go process; consequently, response inhibition will succeed less often. The inhibition functions
for Experiments 1–3 are consistent with the predictions of the independent race model, and suggest
that a stop process was required to withhold the response when a signal occurred. The presence of a
stop-P3 in the stop-signal ERPs (see Appendix A) in Experiments 2–3 further indicates that subjects
engaged a stopping mechanism on stop-signal trials.4 In this study, it was difficult to correlate the ERP switch-repeat difference with the behavioral switch cost because a smaller
behavioral switch-repeat difference could be due to advance preparation on switch trials or increased response slowing (due to
response strategy adjustments) on repeat trials.
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In Experiment 2, we further explored the idea that proactive control adjustments modulate both
stimulus-detection and response-related processes in both the stop and double-response contexts
(Study Aims 1 and 2). The ERP positivity induced by a switch of context, which was our on-line mea-
sure of proactive reconfiguration of control parameters in Experiment 1, cannot be unambiguously
linked to a specific processing stage. Indeed, in the task-switching domain, the switch positivity has
been elicited by changes in both perceptual and response-related task-set components (see
Karayanidis et al., 2010, for a discussion). In Experiment 2, we therefore focused on post-stimulus
ERP components reflecting the application of control settings in different contexts because these
ERP components have the potential to distinguish between processing stages (and the associated
parameters). We simplified the design by blocking contexts so that all trials (apart from the first trial
of a block, which was excluded from the analyses) were context repetitions.4.1. Method
4.1.1. Subjects
Thirty right-handed adults (19 female) with an average age of 24 (ranging from 18 to 48) were paid
£12 for their participation in this study.4.1.2. Apparatus, stimuli, and procedures
The set-up and paradigmwere very similar to those in Experiment 1, except for the differences out-
lined below. We removed the trial-by-trial switching manipulation, hence one cue/stimulus per con-
text was sufficient, and single characters replaced the strings. The characters ‘=’ (ignore context), ‘+’
(double-response context), and ‘X’ (the stop context) subtended 1.4 visual angle.
Each block of 60 trials consisted of three runs of 20 trials of the same context (e.g., 20 ignore, 20
double-response, 20 stop context trials). The order of the contexts was the same for all 18 blocks in
the experiment for a given subject, but was counterbalanced across subjects. In each run of 20 trials,
14 trials were no-signal trials and six were signal trials. Each trial started with a blank screen with a
gray background for 500 ms, which was followed by the cue. After 250 ms the cue turned yellow or
green (i.e. became the go stimulus). It stayed on the screen until a response was given or 1500 ms
had passed. On signal trials the stimulus turned bold after a variable delay (see details for the SOA
calculation below). Feedback was provided on every trial. On no-signal, ignore signal, and double-
response signal trials, the word ‘‘correct” was displayed after correct responses, ‘‘wrong key” was dis-
played after an incorrect key press, and ‘‘try to respond faster” was shown if no response was detected
within 1500 ms on no-signal and ignore-signal trials or if subjects did not respond in time to the signal
on double-response trials (i.e. 1500 ms minus SOA). On stop-signal trials ‘‘correct” was displayed after
a successful stop, and ‘‘try to stop” was shown after a failed stop. The feedback stayed on the screen for
750 ms, after which the next trial started.
In this version of the paradigm, subjects only switched contexts twice in a block of 60 trials (i.e.,
after a run of 20 trials in one context). Before the first trial of the next context, the screen went blank
for 1500 ms. Subjects were told in advance that this indicated the change to the next context (the
order of contexts was known to them and they had experienced context changes in the practice ses-
sion). Nevertheless we excluded the first trial of each run to minimize the effects of context switching
and start-up effects (e.g., Allport & Wylie, 2000; Gopher et al., 2000).
Subjects started with a practice session consisting of two blocks, which were identical to the exper-
imental blocks with the exception that SOAs were fixed at 100, 250 and 400 ms. After completion of
those blocks, each subject’s mean reaction time of correct no-signal trials was calculated for each con-
text. For each subject, the three SOAs for the rest of the experiment corresponded to 25%, 50% and 75%
of their mean RT in the first two practice blocks for a given context. Subjects then performed one more
practice block with the individualized SOAs before starting the experimental session.
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The EEG set-up and pre-processing steps were the same as in Experiment 1, except that there were
no analyses of the preparation interval. For no-signal trials, the EEG was cut into segments time locked
to the stimulus, from 350 ms preceding to 1000 ms following go stimulus onset. Segments were base-
line corrected to the 350–250 ms average preceding the color stimulus onset. This interval was used
(instead of the common 100 to 0 ms pre-go-stimulus interval) to avoid the contamination of the
baseline by potential differences between contexts elicited by the cue (appearing 250 ms before the
go stimulus). As before, we focused on no-signal trials only to test our account of proactive inhibitory
control. The ERP averages for each context and subject contained about 150 trials.
4.2. Results and discussion
4.2.1. Behavioral results
Consistent with Experiment 1, we focus on no-signal trials only (but see Appendix A for the signal
data). Response times for no-signal trials were significantly longer in the stop context (M = 807 ms,
sd = 122 ms) than in the ignore context (M = 469 ms, sd = 108 ms), t(29) = 13.5, p < .001, dav = 2.94,
and in the double-response context (M = 582 ms, sd = 144 ms), t(29) = 10.7, p < .001, dav = 1.69. The
RT difference between double-response and ignore was also significant, t(29) = 5.2, p < .001, dav = 0.9.
The probability of a correct response was higher in the stop context (M = 98.8%, sd = 1.4%) than in
the ignore context (M = 96.8%, sd = 2.8%), t(29) = 4.01, p < .001, dav = 0.971, and in the double-
response context (M = 98.1%, sd = 1.6%), t(29) = 2.37, p < .05, dav = 0.431. The difference between
the ignore context and the double-response context was also significant, t(29) = 4.12, p < .001,
dav = 0.638. The number of missed responses was overall very low (too low to warrant inferential
statistics): stop context (M = 0.8%, sd = 1.3%), ignore context (M = 0.2%, sd = 0.5%), and double-
response context (M = 0.1%, sd = 0.3%).
4.2.2. ERP results
As in Experiment 1 we examined the early perceptual components N1 and SN (see Fig. 5A), as well
as the P3 (Fig. 5B), and the response-locked LRPs (Fig. 5C). As mentioned above, we analyzed the ERPs
for no-signal trials only.
4.2.2.1. N1. N1 amplitudes were largest in the stop context (7.6 lV), followed by the double-
response context (7.1 lV) and the ignore context (6.3 lV). All differences were significant: stop
versus ignore, t(29) = 4.48, p < .001, dav = 0.37, double-response versus ignore, t(29) = 3.0, p < .05,
dav = 0.23, and double-response versus stop, t(29) = 2.71, p < .05, dav = 0.14. These findings are consis-
tent with the results of Experiment 1 (although it should be noted that the numerical differences
between the double-response and the other contexts were not significant in Experiment 1). Combined,
these results suggest the perceptual analysis of the color stimulus is influenced by proactive control in
the stop context, and to a smaller extent, in the double-response context. Note that an inspection of
electrodes PO7 and PO8 also revealed some numerical differences between contexts preceding the
onset of the go stimulus (during the cue to go stimulus interval). Since we had no predictions about
these effects, we present the exploratory analysis of this effect in Appendix F.
4.2.2.2. Selection Negativity. As for the N1, the SN amplitude was most negative in the stop context
(3.06 lV), followed by the double-response context (2.88 lV) and the ignore context (1.91 lV).
The difference between the ignore context and the stop context was significant, t(29) = 6.0, p < .001,
dav = 0.66, as was the difference between the ignore and double-response contexts, t(29) = 4.77,
p < .001, dav = 0.55. The difference between the stop and double-response contexts was not significant,
t(29) = 1.0, p = .33, dav = .1. The numerical differences are consistent with Experiment 1, but there the
difference between the double-response and ignore context failed to reach significance after correction
formultiple comparisons.Wepropose that the SN effects reflect differences in the feature analysis of the
go stimulus: the analysis ismore thorough to facilitate detection of a possible feature change (the signal)
in the contexts in which subjects may have to change their actions. In other words, the SN is modulated
by proactive adjustments of attentional settings to enhance detection of the (visual) signal.
Fig. 5. Experiment 2, post go stimulus waveforms for all contexts: A in electrodes PO8 (left) and PO7 (right), B in Cz, C response-
locked LRPs.
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smaller P3 in the double-response context, and the smallest P3 in the stop context (Fig. 5B, for an anal-
ysis with region as a factor see Appendix D). The difference between the ignore context and the stop
and double-response contexts were significant, t(29) = 5.05, p < .001, dav = 0.884, and t(29) = 3.37,
p < .01, dav = 0.536, respectively. This confirms that the response decision is easiest in the ignore con-
text. While the P3 difference between the double-response and stop context failed to reach signifi-
cance in Experiment 1, it was reliable in Experiment 2, t(29) = 3.65, p < .01, dav = 0.39. This is
presumably due to a better signal to noise ratio resulting from the larger number of segments in
the averages of Experiment 2. The difference between the double-response and stop contexts is con-
sistent with the idea that response-thresholds are increased in stop-signal contexts but not (or to a
lesser extent) in the double-response context (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a); consequently, selecting
the response takes longer in stop contexts than in double-response contexts.4.2.2.4. Lateralised Readiness Potential. The r-LRP (Fig. 5C) reached 30% of peak amplitude at 226 ms
in the double-response context, at 223 ms in the stop context, and at 155 ms in the ignore context.
The onset latencies estimated by fitting the bilinear function were 484 ms for the double-response
context, 402 ms for the stop context, and 318 ms for the ignore context. Some of these differences
were significant for the 30% method (see Appendix E for details), but none was for the bilinear method
(because of large inter-individual variability in some conditions). This means that the two r-LRP onset
estimation methods did not converge for any of the contrasts, thus precluding firm conclusions from
the above numerical differences. Peak latencies were 56 ms in the stop context, 58 ms in the
double-response context and 60 ms in the ignore context. None of these differences were significant
(all p’s > 0.5). Peak amplitudes were numerically smaller in the stop context than in the ignore context
and the double-response context but these differences did not survive correction for multiple compar-
isons (corrected p’s: p = .1 and p = .06, respectively). The difference between the double-response and
the ignore context was also not significant (p = .7).5. Experiment 3
In Experiment 2, we found that the N1, the Selection Negativity and P3 were modulated in stop-
and double-response contexts. Similar (numerical) differences were observed in Experiment 1. Com-
bined, these experiments indicate that attentional selection and response selection in the go task are
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between the double-response and ignore contexts in Experiment 1, though present numerically,
was not conclusively confirmed.
In Experiment 3, we sought to provide additional evidence that the modulations of the N1 and the
SN are indeed due to increased monitoring for the stop signal. To achieve the latter we decided to
change the modality of the signal from visual to auditory. If the modulations of the N1 and SN reflect
increased monitoring for a visual signal we should not find a modulation of these components in the
current experiment; we tested this null hypothesis using Bayesian statistics.
5.1. Method
5.1.1. Subjects, stimuli, procedure, and analyses
Thirty right-handed adults (20 female) with an average age of 22 (ranging from 18 to 46) were paid
£12 to take part in this study. The paradigm was identical to the one in Experiment 2, with one excep-
tion: the visual signal was replaced by an auditory signal, a 500 Hz tone played over loudspeakers
placed to the left and right of the screen. The EEG set-up and data processing procedures were iden-
tical to those in Experiment 2.
5.2. Results and discussion
5.2.1. Behavioral results
Response times for no-signal trials in stop context (M = 673 ms, sd = 118 ms) were significantly
longer than RTs in the ignore context (M = 456 ms, sd = 69 ms), t(29) = 13.2, p < 0.001, dav = 2.32, and
RTs in the double-response context (M = 493 ms, sd = 73 ms), t(29) = 10.6, p < 0.001, dav = 1.89. The
RT difference between the double-response and ignore contexts was also significant, t(29) = 6.4,
p < 0.001, dav = 0.52.
The percentage correct go responses was higher in the stop context (M = 98.8%, sd = 1.7%) than in
the ignore context (M = 96.9%, sd = 2.3%), t(29) = 5.12, p < .001, dav = 0.967, and in the double-
response context (M = 98.2%, sd = 1.1%), t(29) = 2.91, p < .01, dav = 0.449. The difference between
the ignore context and the double-response context was also significant, t(29) = 3.49, p < .01,
dav = 0.753. As in Experiment 2, the number of missed responses was too low to warrant inferential
statistics: stop context (M = 0.4%, sd = 0.7%), ignore context (M = 0.1%, sd = 0.3%), double-response con-
text (M = 0.1%, sd = 0.3%).
5.2.2. ERPs
Again, we analyzed the ERPs for no-signal trials only. The ERP averages for each context and subject
contained about 150 trials.
5.2.2.1. N1. Mean N1 amplitudes were 7.4 lV in the stop context, 7.5 lV in the double-response
context, and 7.2 lV in the ignore context (Fig. 6A). These differences between contexts were not sig-
nificant (p’s > .3, uncorrected). To confirm the absence of the effect of context on the N1 amplitudes in
Experiment 3, we calculated a Bayes factor, which compares two hypotheses: the hypothesis that the
stop and double-response contexts modulate the amplitude of the N1 (compared to the ignore con-
text) and the null hypothesis (i.e., no difference between contexts). Bayes factors vary between 0
and infinity with values of less than .33 indicating substantial support for the null hypothesis and val-
ues greater than 3 indicating substantial support for the alternative. We used Zoltan Dienes’ online
calculator (http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm) assuming a
normal distribution with a mean of 1.07 lV (the numerical difference between the average N1
amplitude in the stop and double-response contexts and the N1 amplitude in the ignore context in
Experiment 2), and a standard deviation that is half of the mean. The resulting Bayes factor was
0.32, indicating that the data provided substantial support for the null hypothesis. Thus, when a
potential signal was presented in the auditory domain, the early perceptual analysis of the visual
go stimulus did not differ between the dual-task and ignore contexts. This is in marked contrast to
the results from Experiment 1, where there were significant differences in N1 amplitudes between
Fig. 6. Experiment 3, post go stimulus waveforms for all contexts: A in electrodes PO8 (left) and PO7 (right), B in Cz, C response-
locked LRPs.
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between all three contexts.
5.2.2.2. Selection Negativity. The amplitude of the SN was also numerically comparable in the three
contexts (Fig. 6A) and none of the contrasts approached significance (all p’s > .3, uncorrected). To con-
firm the null hypothesis, we calculated a Bayes factor comparing the hypotheses that stop and double-
response contexts modulate the amplitude of the SN and the null (i.e., no difference between con-
texts). We assumed a normal distribution with a mean of 1.07 lV (the numerical difference between
the average SN amplitude in the stop and double-response contexts and the amplitude in the ignore
context in Experiment 2), and a standard deviation that is half of the mean. The resulting Bayes factor
was 0.23, indicating that the data provided substantial support for the null hypothesis. In other words,
the stop and double-response contexts did not modulate the amplitude of the SN when the double-
response and stop signals were auditory.
5.2.2.3. P3. The P3 amplitude was larger in the ignore context than in the stop context, t(29) = 5.54,
p < .001, dav = 0.983 (Fig. 6B). The difference between the double-response and the stop contexts
was also significant, t(29) = 6.1, p < .001, dav = 0.817, whereas the double-response vs. ignore differ-
ence was not, t(29) = 1.8, p = .5, dav = 0.220. For an analysis with scalp region as a factor, see Appendix
D. In all the regions, amplitudes were less positive in the stop context than in the ignore- and double-
response contexts. In sum, as in Experiment 2, the amplitude of P3 was smallest in the stop context
and largest in the ignore context.
5.2.2.4. Lateralised Readiness Potential. Response locked LRPs are shown in Fig. 6C. The r-LRP reached
30% of its amplitude at 241 ms in the stop context, at 176 ms in the double-response context
and at 143 ms in the ignore context. Bilinear function fitting determined the r-LRP onset to be at
424 ms for the stop context, at 336 ms for the double-response context and at 296 ms for the
ignore context. Although for each method some of the differences between conditions were statisti-
cally significant (for the 30% method it was the difference between the double-response and the
ignore contexts; for the bilinear fitting it was the stop vs. ignore difference; see Appendix E), the
two procedures did not converge for any contrast, thus precluding firm conclusions regarding differ-
ences between context in r-LRP onset. R-LRP peak amplitudes were smaller in the stop context
(1.9 lV) than the ignore context (2.7 lV), t(29) = 4.45, p < .001, and the double-response context
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was not significant (p = 0.9). Peak latencies were 66 ms in the stop context, 70 ms in the double-
response context and 68 ms in the ignore context. As in the other two experiments none of these
differences were significant (all p’s > 0.6).
In Experiment 3, r-LRP peak amplitudes were smaller for the stop context compared to the ignore-
and double-response contexts; similar numerical differences were also observed in Experiment 2,
although there they failed to reach significance after correction. Combined, these findings could indi-
cate that motor activity was reduced when preparing to respond in the stop context (Cai et al., 2011).6. General discussion
Recent work on proactive inhibitory control has focused primarily on response-related processes
(e.g. Aron, 2011; Lo et al., 2009; Stuphorn & Emeric, 2012; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a), and neglected
the role of attention. Furthermore, previous studies did not directly examine how proactive inhibitory
control is related to other forms of proactive control and dynamic task-set reconfiguration. The pre-
sent experiments measured ERPs to investigate whether people proactively adjust both attentional
and response settings when they expect a stop signal in the environment (Study Aim 1). Second,
we included a condition in which subjects had to execute a second response when a signal occurred
to examine the specificity of the control adjustments (Study Aim 2). Third, to examine whether adjust-
ing parameters proactively in anticipation of a stop signal is analogous to adjusting task-set parame-
ters during a task switch, Experiment 1 measured the previously documented neurophysiological
‘signature’ of preparing to switch tasks during preparation for a stop signal (Study Aim 3). Combined,
the results of Experiments 1–3 provide clear answers to the three main questions. We will now review
the main findings and discuss their theoretical implications.6.1. A biased competition account of proactive inhibitory control
6.1.1. Proactive modulation of attentional and response settings in stop contexts
Recent studies of response inhibition indicate that people proactively adjust response settings in
anticipation of future acts of control. However, finding a balance between ignoring irrelevant stimuli
in the environment and monitoring for potentially relevant control signals could also be an integral
part of proactive inhibitory control, and more generally, flexible and goal-directed behavior
(Goschke & Dreisbach, 2008).
In Experiments 1 and 2, amplitudes of the N1 and the Selection Negativity were larger in the stop
context than in the ignore context. The occipital N1 reflects the detection of a visual stimulus and the
Selection Negativity has been related to feature selection in a visual stimulus. Therefore, Experiments
1 and 2 indicate that the processing of the go stimulus is influenced by anticipation of a stop signal.
The ‘biased competition’ account of visual attention addresses the issue of how the perceptual system
deals with limited processing capacity in the face of the large amount of visual information provided
by the environment (e.g., Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 2006; Kastner & Ungerleider, 2000). This
theory assumes that there is competition between the different sources of information. Attention
biases specific features, objects or representations to resolve this competition. We propose that
stop-signal detection can be biased by increasing the baseline activity in sensory neurons that code
for specific stop-signal related features; consequently, those features are more likely to win the com-
petition, and hence, stopping is more likely to succeed. The results of Experiment 3 further support the
interpretation of the N1 and Selection Negativity as markers of monitoring for a visual signal because
they were not modulated by context when the signal was auditory. In other words, when the stop sig-
nal is a loud auditory tone, proactive inhibitory control seems to have little or no influence on the pro-
cessing of the visual go stimulus, because there is less competition compared to when both the go
stimulus and the stop signal are both in the visual modality (see e.g. Logan et al., 2014). Note that this
does not imply that subjects do not have to monitor for auditory signals; our ERP results only indicate
that the increased monitoring demands do not interfere with the processing of the visual go stimulus.
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context. P3 amplitudes were larger in the ignore context, in which subjects had to execute a single
go response on all trials, than in the stop context. Our previous work indicates that proactive adjust-
ments can influence the parameters of response selection (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). For example,
we found that response thresholds were higher in stop contexts than ignore contexts, explaining the
longer RTs in the stop context (Logan et al., 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). Although we did not fit
the diffusion model to the current data, the behavioral results suggest that subjects adjusted response
selection parameters in the stop context: RTs increased significantly, and go accuracy also tended to be
higher in the stop context than in the ignore context. The differences in P3 could in part reflect such
strategic adjustments.
The reduced r-LRP amplitude in the stop context of Experiment 3 is likely due to a combination of
at least two response-execution related factors. First, it might be a reflection of reduced activation of
the motor cortex when subjects anticipate a stop signal (Cai et al., 2011; Lo et al., 2009; Wiecki &
Frank, 2013; Wong-Lin et al., 2010). For example, Cai et al. (2011) directly measured corticomotor
excitability on go trials in a stop context (cue signaling ‘maybe stop left/right’) by means of motor
evoked potentials. They found that motor evoked potentials were significantly smaller for the finger
that potentially needed to be stopped compared to when the finger was at rest. Secondly, increased
variability in planning the motor response when there might be the need to stop might contribute
to smaller r-LRP amplitudes in the stop context (although it should be noted that the r-LRP onset com-
parisons were inconclusive).
The present study and previous empirical work suggests that control adjustments before a stop sig-
nal appears are critical for successful response inhibition. Proactive inhibitory control could even lead
to a ‘prepared inhibition reflex’ (Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens, & McLaren, 2014; Verbruggen &
Logan, 2015; for a review of the wider ‘prepared reflex’ literature, see Meiran, Cole, & Braver, 2012).
When attention is biased and the stop response is prepared, response inhibition on stop-signal trials
may not require much control anymore. Consistent with this idea, response inhibition can be triggered
by task-irrelevant primes (e.g. van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Lamme, 2009;
Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c), but these priming effects are only observed in contexts in which subjects
are instructed to stop occasionally (Chiu & Aron, 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c). These findings are
consistent with the prepared reflex idea: once subjects have proactively adjusted attentional and
response settings, the ‘stop response’ can be activated easily by information in the environment. Note
that the ‘prepared reflex idea’ might also explain why going and stopping do not share (much) capac-
ity in standard stop-signal tasks (Verbruggen & Logan, 2015).
6.1.2. Domain-general vs. domain specific control adjustments
We included the double-response context to examine the generality of proactive inhibitory control
adjustments (i.e. strategic adjustments made in anticipation of a stop signal). In Experiment 2, we
found that the N1 and the Selection Negativity were larger in the double-response context than in
the ignore context. This indicates that subjects also monitored for double-response signals. However,
the absence of significant differences between double-response and ignore contexts in Experiment 1,
and the differences between stop and double-response contexts in Experiment 2 suggest that the
overall monitoring demands must have been lower than in the stop context.
The analyses of the P3 also revealed differences between the double-response context and the
ignore context, although they were smaller than the differences between the ignore- and stop con-
texts. As discussed in Experiment 1, P3 differences could be due to increased uncertainty, divided
attention, and increased response selection demands. In Verbruggen and Logan (2009a), we did not
find modulations of the decision-making parameters in a double-response context (but a comparison
of the behavioral results indicates that the double-response condition in the current study was more
difficult than the double-response condition in Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). Thus, our results indicate
that subjects also adjust response settings in the primary task when they anticipate double-response
signals to occur.
Finally, the r-LRP onset results of Experiment 1 show a delay in action programming in the double-
response context compared with the ignore context. This is consistent with results of Smulders, Kok,
Kenemans, and Bashore (1995), who found that response complexity (which was manipulated by
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between r-LRP onset and the execution of the first key press. Our observation of modulations by con-
text of a component that arises after the response decision suggests that even the last stage of action
programming, just before the response is executed, can also be influenced by competition and inter-
ference from the response required by the signal.
In sum, even though there were quantitative differences between the stop and double-response
context at some stages, both were distinctly different from the ignore context. This suggests that
proactive ‘inhibitory’ control involves making adjustments that are also made in other (non-
inhibitory) task contexts. This is consistent with the idea that proactive inhibitory control involves
biasing the competition between sources of information and action options (see above). It is also con-
sistent with the idea that the effects of various acts of control are generally the same: they all change
the parameters of underlying selection processes (Logan et al., 2014). In other words, the distinction
between different acts of proactive control (including proactive inhibitory control and task switching)
may be primarily in which parameters are changed, but not in how they are changed.
6.1.3. The posterior positivity as a marker of proactive adjustments?
Experiment 1 revealed a substantial (30% or more of the ERP amplitude) and protracted
(>400 ms) positive-polarity ERP deflection elicited over the posterior scalp by a switch to the stop con-
text relative to a repetition of this context. This brain potential has all the features of the ‘positivity’
elicited in previous studies by preparation for a task switch; the latter is widely believed to reflect
endogenous task-set reconfiguration (e.g., Karayanidis et al., 2003, 2011; Lavric et al., 2008; but see
e.g., Kang et al., 2014 who argued that it reflects bottom-up retrieval of cue–stimulus associations).
The presence of this component in Experiment 1 suggests that there is considerable overlap between
preparation for inhibitory control and the control processes engaged when preparing for a switch of
tasks. We propose that in both cases, preparation involves adjusting the parameters of attention-
and response selection components of a task-set to support flexible behavior.
One aspect of the switch-related positivity documented here may help gain further insight not only
into proactive control in the stop-signal paradigm, but proactive control of task-sets in general. In
task-switching, the positivity is found when a switch involves changing attentional and response set-
tings, but it is also found when only one of these components must change. Moreover, it does not seem
to matter which task-set component switches, as shown by Rushworth et al. (2002), Rushworth,
Passingham, and Nobre (2005) and Hsieh and Wu (2011), who found that both switching between
stimulus dimensions (without changing the response rules) and switching response rules (without
changing the relevant stimulus dimension) resulted in a posterior positivity. Recent unpublished work
in our laboratory indicates that the positivity is also elicited when bilinguals are asked to prepare to
switch the language for production (in the absence of a change of task or stimulus dimension), and
when subjects prepare to change the response threshold in a paradigm that requires trial-to-trial
switching in the speed-accuracy criterion (in a constant task without a change in stimulus dimensions
or response rules).
Against this background of apparent non-specificity of the positivity, it is intriguing that in our
Experiment 1 the positivity was robust for switches to the stop context, yet it seemed absent for
switches to the ignore context (in the double-response context, we observed a numerical difference
between context switches and context repeats but it was not statistically significant). The present pat-
tern of results shows that having to add an attentional component (to monitor for the signal) or an S-R
rule (to suppress the response in the primary task if a signal is presented) to the task-set does not yield
the same electrophysiological profile as ‘removing’ these task-set components. In particular, the acti-
vation or retrieval of these extra components of the task-set (in the stop context) elicits a positivity
400–800 ms after the cue presentation, whereas the removal of the need to activate or retrieve them
(in the ignore context) does not result in a discernable late positivity. This suggests that advance task-
set reconfiguration as measured by the (late) posterior positivity is predominantly the activation of
(components of) the new/relevant task-set, rather (or more so) than the suppression of the no longer
relevant task-set. This idea is consistent with findings of Karayanidis and colleagues (e.g. Karayanidis
et al., 2009; Nicholson, Karayanidis, Davies, & Michie, 2006), who found that the switch-related
positivity in their studies consisted of an early and a late subcomponent or phase. The early
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switch; these cues are similar to the stop cues used in the present study) and switch-away cues (sub-
jects were informed that the task would switch but the to-be-performed task was only specified upon
target onset). The late subcomponent was only observed for switch-to-cues. Based on this finding,
Karayanidis and colleagues argued that the early component reflects inhibition of the no-longer rele-
vant task (which can occur for both switch-to and switch-away cues), whereas the late component
reflects advance task-set reconfiguration (which can occur only for switch-to cues). In the present
study, we focused on the late component or phase. Thus, the presence of a posterior positivity for
the stop context but the absence for the ignore context seems consistent with Karayanidis et al.’s find-
ing that the late component is observed for switch-to cues but not for switch-away cues.
Finally, most proactive inhibitory control studies contrast short blocks of trials in which subjects
have to stop with blocks in which they can respond on all trials. Furthermore, some have argued that
response settings can only be adjusted at the beginning of a block (see above). Our ERP findings indi-
cate that subjects can proactively adjust attentional and response settings on a trial-by-trial basis,
replicating our previous behavioral findings (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a). Thus, proactive inhibitory
control is highly dynamic.6.2. Benefits and costs of proactive control
Behavioral and computational work indicates that proactive control could be beneficial. For exam-
ple, Lo et al. (2009) presented a neural circuit model of proactive inhibitory control in a countermand-
ing paradigm, in which subjects have to suppress eye movements. Suppression of eye movements on
stop-signal trials involves the activation of fixation neurons (STOP unit), which inhibit movement neu-
rons (GO unit; Boucher et al., 2007). Lo et al. observed high tonic activation of fixation neurons before
the onset of a stop signal, and argued that this was modulated by a top-down proactive control signal.
Importantly, their model showed that whether or not an eye movement was stopped depended to a
large extent on pre-signal activation of fixation neurons (and consequently, the proactive suppression
of motor neurons). Thus, proactive control could be highly beneficial. However, it can also come with
certain costs. Proactive control cannot always be maintained over long periods of time because of the
high metabolic cost of actively maintaining relevant information (Braver et al., 2007) and because of
interference caused by other ongoing tasks (e.g. Blackwell & Munakata, 2014). Proactive control is also
in opposition to a fast, efficient automatization of processes because adhering to contextual goals can
override fast default processing or result in insensitivity to unexpected environmental changes.
Finally, proactive control might compete for resources with other tasks (Braver et al., 2007). For exam-
ple, our recent study showed that subjects were more distracted when they monitored the periphery
for stop signals (Verbruggen, Stevens, et al., 2014). In sum, proactive adjustments seem an inherent
part of response inhibition and executive control, but it requires finding an optimal balance to be
effective.7. Conclusions
Our results show that proactive inhibitory control works by biasing or altering the settings of
lower-level systems that are involved in selecting the relevant stimulus, selecting the appropriate
action, and executing it. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that similar adjustments are made for
various forms of control. The results of Experiment 1 also suggest considerable overlap between
preparatory control in task-switching studies and proactive action control. Our biased competition
account of proactive inhibitory control is consistent with work in the visual attention domain and
the dual mechanisms framework of Braver and colleagues (e.g. Braver, 2012), which deals primarily
with proactive control in interference and working-memory tasks. Thus, the present study pulls
‘proactive inhibitory control’ out of the response inhibition niche and grounds it more firmly in the
wider attention and action control literature.
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A.1. Behavioral data
A.1.1. Experiment 1
On ignore signal trials, subjects responded slower (82 ms) to the go stimulus than on the no-signal
trials, t(31) = 5.65, p < .001, dav = .58. This ignore-signal slowing was much more pronounced than in
our previous studies in which contexts were presented in mini-blocks of 4–8 trials in a predictable
order (e.g., Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a; Verbruggen et al., 2010). Thus, the substantial ignore slowing
in the present study is probably due to increased context conflict and/or context inertia (similar to
task-set conflict/inertia in task switching) caused by the frequent switching between task contexts,
rather than by sensory distraction.
On double-response signal trials, RTs of the first response were 62 ms slower than on no-signal tri-
als, t(31) = 5.02, p < .001, dav = .44. Again, this RT increase is probably due to context conflict and/or
context inertia. Table A1 shows the latencies of the first and second response as a function of SOA.
RTs of the second response differed reliably as a function of SOA, F(2,62) = 55.55, p < .001, partial
g2 = 0.629, whereas RT of the first response was not reliably influenced by SOA, F(2,62) = 0.7, p = .5,
partial g2 = 0.022.
The inhibition functions depicting the relation between p(respond|signal) and the stop signal delay
(SSD) is shown in Fig. A1. The independent horse-race model (Logan & Cowan, 1984) assumes that the
SSD will influence the relative finishing time of the stop process: when SSD increases, the stop process
will start later and therefore, finish later compared to the go process; consequently, response inhibi-
tion will succeed less often. The inhibition function for Experiment 1 is consistent with the predictions
of the independent race model, suggesting that a stop process was required to withhold the response
when a signal occurred. We did not estimate stop-signal latencies because the overall probability of
responding on stop-signal trials was very low (21% on average, for some people as low as 6–7%),5
which would have resulted in unreliable SSRT estimates (Band, van der Molen, & Logan, 2003).
A.1.2. Experiment 2
In the ignore context, RTs were longer on signal trials (M = 475 ms, sd = 128 ms) than on no-signal
trials, but this difference was not reliable, p = .25. Again, this suggests that the large difference
between no-signal trials and ignore-signal trials in Experiment 1 was due to some form of context
inertia or rule conflict caused by the switching of contexts.
In the double-response context, RTs were slightly longer on signal trials (M = 588 ms, sd = 149 ms)
than on no-signal trials. As in the ignore context, this difference was not significant, p = 0.4. Table A1
shows the latencies of the first and second response on double-response signal trials as a function of
SOA. Latencies of second responses differed reliably as a function of SOA, F(2,58) = 65.17, p < .001, par-
tial g2 = .692, but latencies of first responses did not, F(2,58) = 2.63, p = .095, partial g2 = .083.
As in Experiment 1, the inhibition function is consistent with the race model (Fig. A1). Again, prob-
ability of responding on a stop signal trial was too low (21%) to allow a valid estimation of SSRTs.
A.1.3. Experiment 3
In the ignore context, RTs were 13 ms longer on signal trials than on no-signal trials, t(29) = 2.64,
p < .05, dav = 0.18. In the double-response context, first responses were also longer on signal trials
(M = 505 ms, sd = 74 ms) than RTs on no-signal trials (M = 493 ms, sd = 73 ms), t(29) = 3.39, p < .01,
dav = 0.16. Table A1 gives the latencies of the first and second response on double-response signal tri-
als as a function of SOA. Latencies of second responses decreased significantly as a function of SOA, F
(2,58) = 162.41, p < .001, partial g2 = .848. Latencies of first responses also differed as a function of
SOA, F(2,58) = 15.42, p < .001, partial g2 = .347. Table A1 indicates that latencies were longest for
the medium SOA.5 With the EEG acquisition and analysis in mind, we decided to use the same fixed delays in each context in Experiment 1. The
SOAs were relatively short as no-signal RT was short in the ignore context. Consequently, it was relatively easy to stop on most
stop-signal trials. In Experiments 2 and 3, we used different SOAs in each context.
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Fig. A1. Inhibition functions depict the relation between p(respond|signal) (Y-axis) and stop-signal delay (X-axis).
Table A1
Mean RTs in ms for first and second responses on double-response signal trials as a function of SOA for Experiments 1–3.
Short SOA Medium SOA Long SOA
Experiment 1
RT 1 778 797 785
RT 2 963 875 836
Experiment 2
RT 1 581 602 588
RT 2 612 544 553
Experiment 3
RT 1 502 521 490
RT 2 638 548 507
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estimate SSRTs, but see Fig. A1 for the inhibition function.A.1.4. Exploratory analysis of signal ERPs in Experiments 2 and 3
For signal trials the EEG was first cut into a long segment starting from 100 ms preceding the go
stimulus, including the SOA, to 1000 ms following signal onset, and baseline corrected to the 100 ms
preceding the go stimulus (to avoid stimulus-related activity contaminating the baseline). Then, a
smaller segment was cut from 100 ms to 1000 ms time locked to the signal. We only chose
trials from the longest SOA since ERPs for the short and medium SOA are contaminated with
overlapping activity elicited by the preceding go stimulus. Furthermore, at short and medium SOAs,
the refractoriness of ERPs could lead to a false assessment of signal trial amplitudes (Woodman,
2010). As described above, SOAs were calculated individually for each subject and each
condition.
Average durations of the longest SOA were: 521 ms (ranging from 398 to 701 ms) in the stop con-
text, 464 ms (ranging from 291 to 731 ms) in the double-response context, and 356 ms (ranging from
254 to 521) in the ignore context. Large signal-respond rates in the longest SOA in the stop condition
resulted in very low trial numbers in seven subjects, who were therefore excluded for the signal anal-
yses. Low trial numbers in the averages of the remaining subjects together with the exclusion of sub-
jects made a statistical analysis of these waveforms questionable but we present signal trial data at the
descriptive level (plots of grand-average ERP waveforms).
Waveforms time locked to the signal in electrodes PO8 and FCz for Experiments 2 and 3 are shown
in Figs. A2 and A3, respectively. In Experiment 2, the visual N1 amplitude differed substantially
between contexts, suggesting a sensory gain due to increased attention for the stop signal and (albeit
Fig. A2. Experiment 2: waveforms of signal trials in electrodes PO8 and FCz.
Fig. A3. Experiment 3: waveforms for signal trials in electrode FCz.
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seemed to elicit an N2-like component. Amplitudes of the fronto-central P3 differed substantially
between contexts: they were largest for the stop signal, medium for the double-response signal,
and nearly absent for ignore signals.
In Experiment 3, the auditory N1 differed substantially between contexts, with largest amplitudes
for stop signals compared with the double-response and ignore signals. Amplitudes for double-
response signals were slightly larger than for ignore signals. We could not detect a stop-specific mod-
ulation of the N2 in this experiment, possibly due to the large magnitude of overlapping components
(auditory N1 and following fronto-central P3). P3 amplitudes were largest in the stop condition, but
were also increased for double-response signals compared with ignore signals.Appendix B. Estimating the onset of the Lateralised Readiness Potential by fitting a bilinear
function
Among procedures used for estimating the LRP onset, least-square fitting a bilinear function to use
the inflection point as the onset estimate may have important advantages over other methods (e.g.,
Mordkoff & Gianaros, 2000). It computes an actual numerical estimate of the LRP onset, unlike the
more widely used criterion-based method, which compares the latency at which the LRP in different
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se. Another advantage over the criterion-based method is that the estimate based on bilinear fitting is
independent of the maximal LRP amplitude, whereas the criterion-based measure is not. However,
bilinear fitting has its limitations because its outcomes can be heavily influenced by the morphology
of the EEG – the horizontal portion preceding the LRP and the extent to which the rising portion of the
LRP deviates from linearity. We therefore sought convergence between these two procedures in esti-
mating the response-locked LRP onset (see the Method section in the Main Text). Our use of the
criterion-based procedure is presented in the Main Text. Here we outline how we used bilinear func-
tion fitting.
For each jack-knifing sub-average, we fitted a bilinear function, which consisted of a horizontal
portion and a negatively rising portion. We allowed the total length of the fitted portion to vary
between 50 time-points and 75 time-points (100 ms and 150 ms), whilst also allowing the length
of each of two sub-segments (the horizontal and the rising portions) to vary with the constraint that
each of them is at least 20 time-points (40 ms) long – we imposed this constraint to avoid fitting local
noise (brief fluctuations in either sub-segment). The fitting started by determining, by visual inspec-
tion, an approximate LRP onset and providing the fitting algorithm an ‘initial starting point’ which was
set 32 time-points earlier [half of the range of average length of the fitted segment: (50 + 75)/2] than
the approximate LRP onset determined visually. The algorithm then fitted segments that started there,
as well as 1–50 ms later or 1–50 ms earlier than the initial starting point, in increments of 2 ms (1
time-point). For each of these iterations:
– the horizontal portion of the bilinear was allowed to vary between 0.5 mV and 0.5 mV (this range
exceeded any voltages in all the jackknifing sub-averages for the respective time-window) in incre-
ments of 0.05 mV;
– the slope of the rising portion was allowed to vary, such that the maximal slope corresponded to an
end-of-segment voltage of 1 mV (more negative than in any of the jackknifing sub-averages) and
the minimal slope corresponded to an end-of-segment voltage of 0.1 mV (substantially less neg-
ative than in any of the jackknifing sub-averages) in increments of 0.05 mV.
For each jackknifing sub-average, we applied standard least-square fitting and selected the starting
point, length of the fitted bilinear function, amplitude of the horizontal portion and slope that resulted
in the smallest sum-of-squared residuals scaled by (divided by) segment length in time-points (this
scaling was necessary, because otherwise the shorter segments would always result in smaller resid-
uals). The inflection point of the bilinear function from the iteration that resulted in the smallest resid-
ual was recorded as the r-LRP onset for the respective jackknifing sub-average.Appendix C. Does switching influence the N1, SN, and P3 in Experiment 1?
We tested for effects of switching in the different contexts on the N1, SN and P3 components (the r-
LRP calculation requires a further subdivision by left and right hand responses, which did not leave
enough trials). The division of segments by switch-repeat (only one third repeat trials) resulted in
much noisier waveforms and it was not possible to detect unambiguous peaks for the N1 and SN in
a number of participants. We therefore used Miller et al.’s (1998) jackknifing procedure to detect peak
amplitude differences in the N1 and SN. For the P3 analysis this was not necessary because here ampli-
tudes were averaged between 300 and 500 ms to capture its broad peak. N1 amplitudes were mea-
sured as the P1-N1 difference and SN amplitudes as the P2-SN difference, averaged over electrodes
PO7 and PO8. T-tests comparing switch and repeat showed no significant effects in any context for nei-
ther of the components (uncorrected p-values are shown): N1, stop context, t(31) = 0.84, p = .4; N1,
double-response context, t(31) = 0.53, p = .6; N1, ignore context, t(31) = 0.69, p = .5; SN, stop context,
t(31) = 0.12, p = .7; SN, double-response context, t(31) = 0.08, p = .9; SN, ignore context, t(31) = 0.99,
p = .3. T-tests on P3 amplitudes averaged between 300 and 500 ms across three midline regions did
not reveal any effects of switching either: stop context, t(31) = 0.7, p = .5; double-response context,
t(31) = 1.58, p = .1; ignore context, t(31) = 0.06, p = .9.
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We tested for differences between regions (P3a, P3b) with an ANOVA including the factors context
and region. In Experiment 1, amplitudes in all the tested regions were modulated by context, F(2,62)
= 12.76, p < .001, partial g2 = .29. There was no reliable interaction with scalp region (p = 0.07, partial
g2 = .087). In Experiment 2, all regions showed reliable differences between contexts, F(2,58) = 18.23,
p < .01, partial g2 = .386, but with some regional differences in the magnitude of the effect, F(4,116)
= 3.19, p < .05, partial g2 = .099. In Experiment 3, all regions showed reliable differences between con-
texts, F(2,58) = 18.23, p < .01, partial g2 = .386, but with some regional differences in the magnitude of
the effect, F(4,116) = 3.19, p < .05, partial g2 = .099 (see Tables D1–D3).Table D1
Statistics of amplitude differences between contexts for each region in the P3 range (corrected p-values are shown) in Experiment 1.
Region Contrasts t p dav
FrPm Stop vs. ignore 3.81 <.01 0.71
Double-response vs. ignore 4.37 <.01 0.59
Stop vs. double-response 0.93 0.4 0.13
Pm Stop vs. ignore 3.9 <.01 0.57
Double-response vs. ignore 4.24 <.01 0.49
Stop vs. double-response 1.34 0.2 0.15
Om Stop vs. ignore 3.06 <.05 0.42
Double-response vs. ignore 2.58 0.06 0.24
Stop vs. double-response 1.81 0.08 0.17
Table D2
Statistics of amplitude differences between contexts for each region in the P3 range (corrected p-values are shown) for Experiment 2.
Region Contrasts t p dav
FrPm Stop vs. ignore 5.45 <.001 0.82
Double-response vs. ignore 4.14 <.01 0.54
Stop vs. double-response 3.43 <.05 0.31
Pm Stop vs. ignore 4.56 <.001 0.81
Double-response vs. ignore 3.08 <.05 0.48
Stop vs. double-response 3.41 <.01 0.39
Om Stop vs. ignore 4.13 <.01 0.70
Double-response vs. ignore 2.36 <.05 0.40
Stop vs. double-response 3.11 <.01 0.32
Table D3
Statistics of amplitude differences between contexts for each region in the P3 range (corrected p-values are shown) for Experiment 3.
Region Contrasts t p dav
FrPm Stop vs. ignore 6.63 <.001 1.24
Double-response vs. ignore 2.51 0.054 0.41
Stop vs. double-response 6.05 <.001 0.93
Pm Stop vs. ignore 5.03 <.001 0.87
Double-response vs. ignore 1.38 0.18 0.13
Stop vs. double-response 5.6 <.001 0.77
Om Stop vs. ignore 3.42 <.01 0.51
Double-response vs. ignore 0.45 0.65 0.04
Stop vs. double-response 4.53 <.001 0.47
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See Table E1.Table E1
R-LRP onset estimations using the 30% of peak amplitude criterion and bilinear function fitting for all three experiments.
Contrast 30% criterion mean diff, t-statistics Bilinear function fitting mean diff; t-statistics
Experiment 1
Stop vs. ignore 18 ms, t(31) = 0.77, p = .4 116 ms, t(31) = 2.88, p < .05
Double-resp. vs. ignore 51 ms, t(31) = 3.06, p < .05 188 ms, t(31) = 5.18, p < .001
Stop vs. double-resp. 33 ms, t(31) = 1.67, p = .2 72 ms, t(31) = 2.58, p < .05
Experiment 2
Stop vs. ignore 68 ms, t(29) = 2.32, p = .054 84 ms, t(29) = 0.84, p = .4
Double-resp. vs. ignore 71 ms, t(29) = 2.77, p < .05 166 ms, t(29) = 1.71, p = .09
Stop vs. double-resp. 3 ms, t(29) = 0.13, p = .9 82 ms, t(29) = 1.54, p = .1
Experiment 3
Stop vs. ignore 98 ms, t(29) = 2.21, p = .07 128 ms, t(29) = 4.4, p < .001
Double-resp. vs. ignore 176 ms, t(29) = 15, p < .05 40 ms, t(29) = 077, p = .4
Stop vs. double-resp. 65 ms, t(29) = 1.59, p = .1 88 ms, t(29) = 1.62, p = .1Appendix F. An exploratory analysis of the posterior positivity in Experiments 2–3
Experiment 2 also revealed an unexpected ERP feature: visual inspection of the ERP waveforms
suggests that amplitudes between contexts already differed quite considerably at the onset of the
color stimulus (see Fig. 5). This could reflect a preparation-related positivity: Given that context
was 100% predictable in this experiment, subjects could prepare for action control before the stimulus
turned yellow or green. Similar to the preparation-related posterior positivity in Experiment 1, ampli-
tudes were most positive in the stop context, slightly less positive in the double-response context, and
least positive in the ignore context (see Fig. 5A and B). An exploratory analysis of the amplitudes aver-
aged between 0 and 100 ms following the go stimulus, with context, scalp region and laterality (Fig. 2)
as within-subjects factors showed a reliable main effect of context, F(2,58) = 22.19, p < .001 (uncor-
rected), partial g2 = .434. Subsequent tests revealed that differences between contexts were all reli-
able: stop vs. ignore: F(1,29) = 52.99, p < .001, partial g2 = .646; stop vs. double-response, F(1,29)
= 9.86, p < 0.01, partial g2 = .254; and double-response vs. ignore: F(1,29) = 10.66, p < .001, partial
g2 = .269. The distribution of this component is similar to the distribution of the posterior switch pos-
itivity observed in Experiment 1, and might reflect some form of context-related preparation.
We also observed this posterior positivity in Experiment 3: Amplitudes already differed between
contexts at and immediately following the color change of the stimulus (at 0–100 ms, see Fig. 6), F
(2,58) = 13.28, p < .01, partial g2 = .314. Amplitudes were more positive in the stop and double-
response contexts than in the ignore context, F(1,29) = 29.64, p < .001, partial g2 = .505, and F(1,29)
= 9.68, p < .01, partial g2 = .25, respectively. Amplitudes were more positive in the stop context than
in the double-response context, but only in right lateralized, posterior regions of the scalp (main
effect: F(1,29) = 2.04, p = .16, partial g2 = .066; context by region interaction: F(3,87) = 9.77, p < .001,
partial g2 = .252; context by laterality: F(2,58) = 3.44, p < .05, partial g2 = .106.References
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